Greg Detre
14/02/02
Mental representation
is mental representatoin the same phenomenon in input + general?
does it relate differently to input modules + general intelligence?
reasons � guide us through state � state transitions
grasp why the transitions (in belief-formation) are right
input modular representations � know nothing of them
mechanical laws
possible to retrain but not a matter of rational reflection
conceptual, central system � usually available to consciousness
sometimes, the outputs (shallow) of modules are salient
Evant � explain conscious perceptual experience in terms of the information link between the input modules and the conceptual systems
what about blindsight?
access consciousness � used for rational control/speech + reasoning (see Evans� definition)
phenomenal consciousness = �experience�, what it�s like
P without A, e.g. hearing a car without paying attention
A without P, e.g. blindsight
�super�-blindsight � self-prompting
analysing phenomenal consciousness: having sensations
representations + their organisation
Block is fairly in favour phenomenal consciousness in terms of sensations
Neural correlates of consciousness
Crick-Koch � the NCC = the synchronised firing that is the upshot of the binding problem having been solved,� i.e. responding to a single object
upstream or downstream though?
depends on representationalism
amounts to only access consciousness
no methodology for finding the NCC of phenomenal
Elusiveness + epiphenomenalism
caught in a room with a bat � fundamentally alien intelligence
no amount of scientific knowledge of the physiology of a bat will telel you what it would be like to be a bat
Jackson � Mary
inverted, absent qualia
how resist epiphenomenalism?
maybe mental representation depends on consciousness � then consciousness is doing some work
Searle � connection principle
high price to pay
doesn't distinguish between mental representation in input vs central systems
�
phenomenal consciousness provides concepts of ID of objects around us
can you get �super�-blindsight???
binding problem disappears with multiple drafts???
Chalmers � Available in the objective basis of experience (ch 5 or 6)
Dawkins � The Blind Watchmaker, intro